We examine the spillover effects that occur within Korean business groups (i.e., chaebols) by focusing on the market reactions of event firms to announcements of credit rating changes. We find that there are positive spillovers (caused by positive market reactions) and negative spillovers (caused by negative market reactions) that are driven by the market reactions of event firms. Our analyses indicate that negative spillovers are more dominant than positive spillovers. Moreover, a spillover that is driven by a leading firm within a business group has stronger effects on other firms in the group than a spillover that is driven by a non-leading firm. This suggests that the market evaluation of a business group is conducted more on the basis of a leading firm than a non-leading firm within a group. Finally, we show that the spillover effects that are analyzed in our study are more noticeable when the business relationship between an event firm and other affiliated firms is closer. (JEL G14, G24) Keywords: Credit Rating Change; Event Study; Spillover; Business Group; Chaebol.
Introduction
This study investigates the spillover effects within Korean business groups by focusing on the market reactions of firms to announcements of credit rating changes. While the literature on market contagion and spillovers generally examines correlations of financial market responses from an industry perspective, this study focuses on the idea that group-affiliated firms experience co-movements within a business group during contagious events. Chang and Hong (2000) report that in Korea, group-affiliated firms benefit from their group membership by sharing many forms of resources with other member firms. This practice suggests that firms within a Korean business group (i.e., a chaebol) maintain significant business ties with other affiliated firms within the group. Indeed, Bae et al. (2008) investigate the implications of spillover effects within a Korean business group. They report that the earnings announcement by a firm has spillover effects on the stock returns of non-announcing firms within the same group. This indicates that a relationship exists among firms in the same business group. However, we employ credit rating events instead of earnings announcements. A credit rating is evaluated by outsiders and independent rating agencies, while a numerical value of earnings can be allowably adjusted by a business group's insiders. Further, we focus on spillover effects that are driven by market participants across firms within a business group; thus, announcements concerning credit ratings are more suitable for our study's purpose. Moreover, credit ratings have become more important for chaebol firms since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Bereskin et al. (2015) note that governance reforms after the crisis have caused greater dependence on external financing and that many of these changes in financing are concentrated in chaebol firms. Consequently, the announcements of credit rating changes are particularly suited for an examination of the phenomena with regard to chaebol firms.
We use Korean chaebols because they have certain characteristics that make them especially suitable for the examination of spillover effects within business groups. One particular feature is the heavily concentrated ownership of chaebol firms, which allows the controlling owner to exercise significant control over the entire group. Such control enables each chaebol firm to pursue a group-level strategy rather than to act as a stand-alone firm. Another important feature is the strong business ties among firms in the same chaebol group. As a result, these firms share the tangible and intangible resources within their group. For example, Korean chaebols typically establish group-level research and development (R&D) centers in order to support the sustainable development of the whole group. Further, the firms in a chaebol group share not only technological innovations but also human resources through the transfer of key personnel among affiliates within the group. Internal capital markets within chaebols also play a role in allocating capital among group member firms (Shin and Park, 1999) . Lastly, Korean chaebols participate in various industries and influence the Korean economy. They have participated in diverse industries under the policy support of the government during Korea's rapid economic growth.
Indeed, a diverse set of industries is the basic characteristic of Korean chaebols.
In order to show the existence of spillover effects among chaebol-affiliated firms, we examine the relationship between the abnormal returns of an event firm and the abnormal returns of the portfolio of other firms in the same group. Our analyses demonstrate that among chaebolaffiliated firms, spillover effects that occur as a result of credit rating changes exist in the stock market. Specifically, we focus on the market reaction of an event firm rather than the event itself.
The basic intuition behind these analyses is as follows: Chaebol-affiliated firms experience comovements within a business group during firm-specific events because the close relationship among firms in the same group is well known to the market participants. Thus, the abnormal market reaction to an event is more important than the event's characteristics with regard to spillovers within a business group. Above all, the market reaction conditions the market's expectations about the credit rating change event; thus, the market reaction captures the surprise component of rating changes better than the rating changes themselves. In other words, whether the market participants view the rating change of an event firm favorably or unfavorably is more meaningful than whether the rating change of the firm is upgraded or downgraded. For example, when the National Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE) credit rating agency decides to downgrade the credit rating of the Hyundai Motor Company, the effect on the stock prices of the members of the Hyundai Motor Group depends on the stock price of the Hyundai Motor
Company. If the abnormal return of the Hyundai Motor Company is positive even though its credit rating has just been downgraded, the abnormal returns of Hyundai Motor Group affiliates will also be positive on average. Indeed, our evidence suggests that the market evaluation of a firm by an event plays an important role in determining the characteristics of spillover effects within a business group.
Further, we extend our analyses by comparing negative spillovers (caused by negative market reactions of event firms) with positive spillovers (caused by positive market reactions of event firms). Because negative events (or bad news) generally have a significant impact on market participants rather than positive events (or good news), 1 it could be worth asking if spillover effects that are driven by market reactions are asymmetric. Essentially, our results indicate that spillover effects have differential impacts in accordance with the signs of market 1 In accordance with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , asymmetric reaction to good and bad news can be explained by different responses to positive and negative perceptions. In general, people pay more attention to a loss in utility than they do to a gain of equal magnitude. Soroka (2006) notes that responses to positive and negative information are asymmetric. In other words, reactions to negative information are much greater than reactions to positive information.
reactions. In this regard, negative spillovers are more dominant than positive spillovers. The findings also suggest that market participants react strongly against concerns about specific events caused by group-affiliated firms.
Korean business groups consist of leading firms that symbolically represent their chaebol groups. This situation is generally characterized by the large size of the leading firms' assets and their highly profitable and mature natures. 2 Further, not only insiders of a chaebol group but also market investors regard a leading firm as the prominent firm in a group. For example, with regard to the Samsung Group, Samsung Electronics should be the leading firm because it is the largest and most influential firm in the group. This approach suggests that spillovers that are driven by a leading firm are stronger than those that are driven by a non-leading firm. Our results conform to this argument because they reflect the implications of market perspectives on a business group. In other words, market participants are more interested in a leading firm and more sensitive to negative reactions with regard to spillovers within a business group (i.e., negative spillovers are more dominant than positive spillovers).
Finally, we examine the relationship between spillover effects and business relationships within business groups by separating our event samples into two subsamples in terms of whether the levels of business relationship with group member firms are above the median or not. 3 Some information on the business associations among chaebol firms must be made public in accordance with government regulations in Korea. Even though such information is rare and ambiguous, its public availability means that market participants can perceive the specific 2 We define a leading firm as the largest firm in a business group. The list of leading firms is calculated using the book value of total assets every year. In order to check robustness, we apply alternative criteria to define a leading firm such as total sales and the market value of equity. We obtain qualitatively identical results to those reported in the study. 3 In order to measure business relationships between event firms and other affiliated firms, we employ diverse variables (e.g., receivables, payables, sales, and purchases) that are associated with affiliated firms.
business relations among a group's member firms. Thus, spillover effects should be more noticeable when an event firm has more business ties with its affiliated firms. Consistent with this argument, our results show that the spillover effects analyzed in our study are more dominant when the business association between an event firm and its affiliated firms is closer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 explains our empirical approach and the associated data, and Section 4 discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
Related Literature and Hypothesis Development

Korean Business Groups: Chaebols
Business groups are the principal and typical entities that manage various businesses. Second, the ownership structure of a chaebol is heavily concentrated in the hands of owner-managers or founding families that exercise complete control over the affiliated firms within a group. These controlling shareholders, rather than professional management, have the discretionary power to make major strategic decisions at group level (Shin and Park, 1999; Song et al., 2012) . Such an ownership structure provides the controlling shareholders with an incentive to expropriate other investors in the firm. For example, Bae et al. (2002) show that chaebol firms benefit from acquisitions that provide a way for controlling shareholders to increase their wealth by increasing the value of other group firms (i.e., tunneling). Consistent with tunneling within business groups, Baek et al. (2006) find that chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offer prices in order to benefit their controlling shareholders. Moreover, the ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders (Lemmon and Lins, 2003) . Indeed, Baek et al. (2004) show that during the 1997 Korean financial crisis, chaebol firms experienced a greater fall in equity value when ownership was concentrated among controlling family shareholders compared with firms that had higher equity ownership by foreign investors. Further, Joh (2003) (Bae et al., 2008) .
Following the financial crisis, one of the important goals of the reforms was the improvement of the Korean credit rating system. The result was that the system was significantly enhanced. Hahm (1999) notes the progress in upgrading the credit information and rating system. This progress includes strict government management of credit rating agencies, increasing transparency through public disclosure, and mandatory credit rating of all marketable debts.
Further, Oh (2014) observes that the level of competition in the credit rating industry has significantly increased following the financial crisis and that the market structure has become an oligopoly in a contestable market, a situation that is economically equivalent to perfect competition.
Prior to the financial crisis, chaebol firms depended mostly on internal financing within chaebols. For example, Shin and Park (1999) hence, the authors suggest that public debt markets serve as substitutes for internal capital markets. Bereskin et al. (2015) note that governance reforms after the financial crisis have caused greater dependence on external financing and that many of these changes in financing are concentrated in chaebol firms. Further, Lim (2006) reports an increase in non-guaranteed corporate bond issuance after the financial crisis. This has significantly increased the demand for credit ratings. Consequently, credit ratings have become more important to chaebols following the Asian financial crisis.
Spillover Effects
Abundant literature exists on various transfer channels through which spillover effects within an industry, across industries, across countries, through supply chains, and among counterparties may occur. Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate a contagion effect and a competitive effect in the same industry by using stock price reactions of intra-industry rivals. They find that Although prior research on spillover or contagion effects is abundant, little evidence exists about whether the event of a firm in a business group affects other affiliated firms in the same business group. Bae et al. (2008) report the stock-price effects of Korean business groups by using the earnings announcement. They find that announcing an increase (decrease) in earnings by a chaebol-affiliated firm has positive (negative) effects on the abnormal returns of other affiliated firms in the same group. 6 Similarly, with respect to the unique characteristics of chaebol groups, we expect that a specific event that involves the credit rating of a chaebolaffiliated firm affects other member firms within a group in the same direction because the close business relationship among group member firms is publicly known.
Many studies have investigated credit rating events in terms of abnormal stock or bond returns around an event date (Dichev and Piotrovski, 2001; Hand et al., 1992; Holthausen and Leftwitch, 1986; Jorion and Zhang, 2010; Pinches and Singleton, 1978) . Our study extends the findings of prior studies by using the announcement of credit rating changes to investigate the spillover effects within a business group. Further, we focus on the market reactions of event firms rather than whether the credit rating changes are upgrades or downgrades. We adopt this approach because market participants are more perceptive about the close association among group member firms. Specifically, the market response to the event of a firm is transferred from an event firm to other affiliates. Thus, the market evaluation of a firm with regard to an event is crucial in order to determine the characteristics of spillover effects. This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The market reaction of an event firm (to a credit rating change) is an important factor in explaining spillover effects within a business group.
The second hypothesis examines whether negative and positive spillovers have differential impacts on other affiliated firms. In general, negative events (or bad news) spread intensively when compared with positive events (or good news). For example, Soroka (2006) shows that public responses to negative news are much greater than those to positive news.
Using time-series analyses of UK media and public opinion, the author finds strong evidence of asymmetry. In addition, numerous studies report that negative credit rating events have a significant negative effect on stock and bond markets; however, positive credit rating events are statistically insignificant. For example, Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) report this effect with stock market data by using Moody's and S&P's rating changes. Norden and Weber (2004) also report a summary of the empirical literature relating to the impact of credit rating announcements. Further, Ferreira and Gama (2007) and Gande and Parsley (2005) indicate that the sovereign debt rating of one country has an asymmetric effect on the financial markets of other countries. Similarly, we expect that the spillover effects that are driven by market reactions are stronger when they are negative than when they are positive. This leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Negative spillover effects are stronger than positive spillover effects within a business group.
An important aspect of Korean chaebols is the role of a leading firm. A leading firm is a representative firm of a chaebol group. It is characterized by the large size of its assets and its profitable and mature nature. Further, a chaebol's leading firm has a symbolic identity in Korea.
Thus, we expect that spillover effects that are driven by a leading firm are more dominant than those that are driven by a non-leading firm because market participants pay more attention to leading firms. Based on this conjecture, we posit the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: A credit rating change that is driven by a leading firm has stronger spillover effects on other affiliated firms in the same business group than a change that is driven by a non-leading firm.
Data and Empirical Methods
Data
Our data are collected from numerous sources including the following: NICE and Bloomberg for credit rating data; the FnGuide for stock market data; the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) for chaebol data; and the TS2000 database provided by the Korea Listed
Companies Association for financial and accounting data.
The primary data set that we examine is the list of chaebol-affiliated firms. We define a chaebol according to the guidelines of the KFTC, which since 1986 has announced the list of chaebol groups annually under the terms of the Fair Trade Act. The KFTC defines a chaebol in two parts: (1) stock ownership by controlling shareholders with the proportion of relevant persons greater than 30%; and (2) the total assets of the affiliated firms in the group (Almeida et al., 2015) . Our sample consists of listed firms affiliated with chaebols from 2001 to 2013.
Because we focus on the spillover effects of credit rating announcements within a business group, each event firm needs to have at least one or more listed affiliated firms, excluding itself. We also divide our event samples into two subsamples: the announcements of leading firms and non-leading firms. A "leading firm" denotes a firm that represents a business group. It is characterized as a large, profitable, and mature firm. In our study, we simply define a leading firm as the largest firm (in terms of the book value of total assets) in a business group every year.
10 Table 2 presents the frequency distribution of credit rating change events in our sample.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the number of events by year and by event firm characteristics (i.e.,
whether an event firm is a leading firm or not). Among all the credit events, the leading firms account for 28.7% of the total number of samples (i.e., 103 of 359 events). Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution of the sample by business groups, which are organized by the number of events. The first column lists the names of business groups; the second lists the number of credit rating change events made by the firms belonging to each business group; the third lists the names of the leading firms matched with the corresponding business groups as of 2013. Among the business groups, the Hyundai Motor, Samsung, LG, Kumho Asiana, and SK groups have a relatively large number of credit rating change events. These top five groups have 49.0% of the total events (i.e., 176 of 359 events).
[Insert: Table 2 ] Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the variables for our sample of 359 event firms.
The mean (median) book value of total assets is ₩4,940 (2,850) billion. The mean return on assets (ROA), which is calculated by the ratio of net income to total assets, is 0.3%. However, the distribution of ROA is highly skewed, with a median of 3.4%. The mean (median) leverage is 59.6% (59.8%), and the market to book ratio is 1.39 (1.07). The mean (median) ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales is 0.7% (0.1%) and that of cash holdings to total assets is 4.6% (3.5%).
[Insert: Table 3 ] Table 3 also presents the descriptive statistics of our event firms in the two subsamples:
leading firms and non-leading firms. The mean ROA of leading firms is 1.9%. In contrast, the ROA of non-leading firms is, on average, -0.4%. The mean market to book ratio of leading firms is lower than that of non-leading firms, which indicates that the characteristics of a leading firm are closer to a value firm than a growth firm. These results imply that leading firms are more profitable and mature than non-leading firms. This is consistent with the result that the mean ratio of R&D expenditure of leading firms is lower than that of non-leading firms. 
Methodology
We employ the standard event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) that calculates the abnormal returns (ARs) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for event firms by using the market model that follows the event dates of credit rating changes. The model also estimates the ARs and CARs for non-event firms in the same business group by using the portfolio approach. 12 The AR for the stock of firm i at time t is defined as follows:
where and are the daily returns for the stock of event firm i at time t and the daily market index (Korea Composite Stock Price Index) return at time t respectively. The parameters ( � , ̂)
are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) market model regressions using a 180-trading-day estimation period ending 20 days prior to the event day. We calculate the CAR between dates 1 and 2 by adding the ARs from day 1 to day 2 . We compute the CARs of non-event affiliated firms in the business groups by using equal-weighting rather than value-weighting in order to understand effectively the spillover effects within business groups.
13
11 The growth firm invests more in R&D than the value firm. 12 We closely follow the empirical approach used by Bae et al. (2008) . 13 In order to check the robustness of our results, we repeat our analyses by using value-weighted CARs and find that our main conclusions remain intact. Table 4 shows that the spillover effects that are driven by the market reactions of event firms exist. We report the mean two-day CAR (0, 1) and five-day CAR (0, 4) for the event firms
Empirical Results
Spillover Effects within Business Groups
and other affiliated firms in the same business groups. We classify our event samples into the two subsamples in accordance with the sign of the CARs of event firms in order to show the market reactions to credit rating changes. The subsample in Panel A includes event firms with a negative CAR, while the subsample in Panel B includes event firms with a positive CAR. We test the statistical significance of CARs for event firms and other affiliates.
[Insert: Table 4 ]
The results show that the average two-day and five-day CARs of the event firms with negative market reactions to credit rating changes are -3.18% and -5.68% respectively. Both of these are significant at the 1% level. The average two-day and five-day CARs of the other corresponding affiliated firms show significant average excess returns of -0.89% and -1.66%
respectively. In contrast, the average two-day and five-day CARs of the event firms with positive market reactions to credit rating changes are 2.93% and 5.56% respectively. Both of these are significant at the 1% level. The average two-day CAR of the corresponding other affiliated firms shows average excess returns of 0.46%, and is not statistically significant. The average five-day CAR of the corresponding other affiliated firms shows average excess returns of 1.59%, which is significant at the 1% level. These findings suggest that a credit rating change of a firm in a business group has spillover effects on the other affiliated firms within the group.
In Table 5 , by conducting regressions, the market reaction of an event firm is shown to be an important factor in explaining spillover effects within a business group. We use the five-day CARs (0, 4) of non-event affiliated firms in the business groups as the dependent variables. Our key explanatory variable of interest is Market Reaction, which is the five-day CAR (0, 4) of an event firm. In regression (1), Market Reaction is used as the independent variable. In regressions (2) and (3), we add firm-level explanatory variables that are listed in Table 3 together with
Credit Rating, which denotes the credit rating of an event firm. 14 In regressions (4) and (5), we add not only firm-level explanatory variables but also group-level explanatory variables.
Regressions (3) and (5) are similar to (2) and (4), with the exception of year and industry fixed effects.
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[Insert: Table 5] In our regression analyses, we focus on the five-day CARs (0, 4) rather than the CARs of the short event periods such as the two-day CARs (0, 1) because the latter may take time to be reflected in the market by an event. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that emerging markets, including the Korean market, are less efficient than developed markets (i.e., emerging markets are weak-form efficient markets). For example, the daily price limit in the Korea Stock Exchange is 15% for all stocks. This is one example of a hindrance to market efficiency. 16 Bae et al. (2008) note that the price limit rules suggest that market participants may have continued to react even after the announcements. Indeed, almost 50% of our events (i.e., 176 of 359 events) experience daily price limits with regard to at least one other firm.
14 Table 1 describes categories for credit ratings and the numerical scale used in our analyses. 15 In our regression analyses, we report the standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. We check that our results are robust to the different levels of clustering (i.e., industry and year clustering). 16 The Korea Stock Exchange introduced the upper and lower limits of daily stock prices in 1998.
Moreover, using an ex post event window such as the five-day CAR (0, 4), instead of an ex ante event window such as the nine-day CAR (-4, 4) , helps to analyze spillovers that are driven by the market reactions of event firms. In this regard, our study focuses on the market reaction to the announcement of a credit rating change rather than the event itself. In general, ex ante periods are used on the assumption that information about an event can be leaked before the announcement. As a result, using the five-day CAR (0, 4) is the adaptive way to examine the spillover effects that are driven by market reaction.
17
We find that the coefficients for Market Reaction are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for all five regressions. For example, the estimated coefficient for Market Reaction in regression (5) is approximately 0.57; namely, all else being constant, a 1% increase in the market reaction of an event firm leads to an approximately 0.57% increase in the CARs of other group members. This result is consistent with the view that the market evaluation of an event firm plays an important role in determining the characteristics of spillover effects. 
Negative Spillovers vs. Positive Spillovers
In this section, we demonstrate that spillovers that are driven by negative market reactions are more dominant than those that are driven by positive market reactions. Table 6 reports the regression estimates. In regressions (1) through (4), we include the indicator Positive Reaction, which takes a value of one if the market reaction of an event firm is positive and zero otherwise. The coefficients for Positive Reaction are significantly negative for all regressions and statistically significant up to the 10% level. We also add the interaction term between Market Reaction and Positive Reaction. The coefficients for the interaction term are negative and significant up to the 5% level. These results suggest that negative spillovers (caused by negative market reactions) are stronger than positive spillovers (caused by positive market reactions).
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[Insert: Table 6] Table 7 shows the impact of leading firms in the spillover effect by dividing our event samples into two subsamples in terms of whether or not they are leading firms in their business groups. Specifically, Panel A of Table 7 presents the spillover effects that are driven by the credit rating changes of leading firms. In contrast, Panel B of Table 7 shows that the credit rating changes of non-leading firms lead to spillover effects on other affiliated firms in their business groups.
Leading Firms vs. Non-Leading Firms
[Insert: Table 7 ]
With regard to leading firms, the mean CARs of other affiliated firms in the same business groups are statistically significant in all cases. Panel A of Table 7 indicates that the mean two-day and five-day CARs of the event firms with negative market reactions to credit 19 There may be a relatively high correlation among Market Reaction, Positive Reaction, and the interaction term that is between them. Thus, to avoid the multicollinearity problem in the regressions that include these variables (i.e., the regressions in Table 6 and Panel B of Table 9 ), we measure the degree of multicollinearity by using the variance inflation factor (VIF). This is employed by many researchers in order to check the degree of multicollinearity (O'Brien, 2007) . As a result, we verify that multicollinearity is not a significant issue that affects our main results.
rating changes are -2.96% and -5.44% respectively. Both of these are significant at the 1% level.
The mean two-day and five-day CARs of the corresponding other affiliated firms show significant average excess returns of -1.72% and -2.13% respectively. In addition, the average two-day and five-day CARs of the event firms with positive market reactions to credit rating changes are 2.93% and 6.10% respectively. Both of these figures are significant at the 1% level.
The mean two-day and five-day CARs of the corresponding other affiliated firms show significant average excess returns of 2.19% and 2.39% respectively.
In contrast, for non-leading firms, the magnitude of mean CARs of other affiliated firms is relatively small. Further, significant test results do not even exist in some cases. Panel B of Table 7 particularly notes that the average two-day and five-day CARs of the event firms with positive market reactions to credit rating changes are 2.93% and 5.38% respectively. The average two-day and five-day CARs of the corresponding other group members are relatively small and not statistically significant. These results suggest that spillover effects caused by a leading firm are stronger than those caused by a non-leading firm. Indeed, there is a large difference between them, particularly with regard to positive spillovers.
We conduct further regression analyses, the results of which are summarized in Table 8 .
We employ the indicator Leading Firm, which takes a value of one if the event is driven by a leading firm and zero otherwise. We also include an interaction term between Market Reaction and Leading Firm. The coefficients for the interaction term are significantly positive for all regressions. This suggests that the positive relationship between the excess returns for the event firms and the excess returns for the other affiliated firms is stronger when the event firms are leading firms. The result is consistent with the view that the credit rating event that is driven by a leading firm has stronger spillover effects on other affiliated firms in the business group than the event that is driven by a non-leading firm.
[Insert: Table 8] Table 9 shows that the spillover effects analyzed in our study are more dominant when the business relationship between an event firm and affiliated firms is closer. In order to measure the extent of a business relationship, we employ diverse variables: Receivable (i.e., the ratio of the amount of receivables associated with affiliated firms to the total assets of an event firm), Payable (i.e., the ratio of the amount of payables related to affiliated firms to the total assets of an event firm), Sales (i.e., the amount of sales to affiliated firms divided by the total sales of an event firm), Purchases (i.e., the amount of purchases from affiliated firms divided by the total sales of an event firm), Debt Guarantee (i.e., the ratio of the amount of debt guarantee for affiliated firms to the total debt of an event firm), Collateral (i.e., the ratio of the amount of collateral for affiliated firms to the total debt of an event firm), and Ownership (i.e., the ratio of the total amount of equity investment for affiliated firms to the equity participation by affiliated firms divided by the entire market value of equity). By using these variables, we construct each dummy variable. These take a value of one if each variable is above its cross-sectional median and zero otherwise.
Spillover Effects and Business Relationships within Business Groups
[Insert: Table 9 ]
First, we repeat our prior regression analysis, the results of which appear in column (5) of Table 5 . We achieve this by including a dummy variable, which measures the level of a business relationship, and an interaction term between the dummy variable and Market Reaction. In Panel A of Table 9 , the coefficients for the interaction terms are positive for all regressions. Further, six out of seven coefficients are statistically significant. Specifically, the spillover effects that are driven by market reactions are stronger when firms possess a large amount of receivables or payables that are associated with affiliated firms, when firms provide a relatively large amount of collateral or debt guarantee for the same group members, when purchases from affiliated firms are higher, and when firms have large ownership structures that are associated with other member firms.
Next, in Panels B and C of Table 9 , we repeat prior regression analyses that correspond to column (2) of Table 6 and column (2) of Table 8 by dividing our event samples into two subsamples. These subsamples are based on whether the levels of business relationship (i.e., seven dummy variables) are high or low. 20 Specifically, the regressions of odd numbers in Panels B and C are performed with event firms that have relatively close business ties with affiliates. In contrast, the samples of the regressions of even numbers in Panels B and C include event firms that have weaker business connections with other group members on average. Panel B of Table 9 shows that the coefficients for interaction terms are lower in most cases (i.e., five out of seven) and those for Positive Reaction are significantly negative and lower in all cases when the levels of business relationship are high. Moreover, the values of adjusted R-squared are overwhelmingly larger in the regression models with odd numbers. In Panel C of Table 9 , most coefficients for interaction terms and all adjusted R-squared values are higher when each dummy variable with regard to a business relationship is equal to one. Overall, the results of Table 9 imply that the business relationship among group-affiliated firms is one of the important factors that explains the spillover effects within business groups.
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides evidence about the spillover effects within Korean business groups (i.e., chaebols). We document a statistically significant positive association between the abnormal returns of event firms and the abnormal returns of portfolios that consist of other group members after the announcements of event firms' credit rating changes. In order to understand the determinants of spillover effects in a group, the market evaluation of a credit rating change event is considered a more important factor than the event itself. Further, we find that spillover effects have differential impacts in accordance with the signs of market reactions. Thus, on average, negative spillovers (caused by negative market reactions) are more dominant than positive spillovers (caused by positive market reactions) regardless of whether the credit rating changes are upgrades or downgrades. We also find that a spillover that is driven by a leading firm of a business group has stronger effects on other firms in the group than a spillover that is driven by a non-leading firm. This finding supports the idea that the market evaluation of a chaebol is conducted more on the basis of a leading firm than a non-leading firm. Finally, we
show that the spillover effects analyzed in our study are more noticeable if the business relationship among business group members is closer.
In short, our empirical findings suggest important implications about the understanding of the spillover effects within a Korean business group and the role of the leading firm of the group in the market. A "leading firm" is defined as the firm whose book value of total assets is the highest in the group. Panel A summarizes the distribution of the sample by year and by characteristics of event firms (i.e., whether or not the event firm is a leading firm). Panel B reports the number of credit rating change events by business groups, organized by the number of events, and also shows leading firms in the business groups as of 2013. This table shows the summary statistics of event firms (credit rating changes) in our sample. Total Asset is the book value of total assets (billion ₩). Size, ROA, Leverage, M/B, R&D, and Cash are calculated by the market value of equity, the ratio of net income to total assets, the ratio of total debt to total assets, the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, the ratio of R&D to sales, and the ratio of cash to total assets respectively. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year and by Event Firm Characteristics
Variables
Full This table presents the spillover effects that are driven by the market reactions of event firms. The average two-day and five-day CARs are reported for the event firms and other affiliate firms in the same business group. We classify our event samples into two subsamples according to the sign of the CARs of event firms. The subsample in Panel A includes event firms with negative CARs (negative spillovers), and the subsample in Panel B includes event firms with positive CARs (positive spillovers). Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. This table presents estimates of OLS regressions with dependent variables of five-day CARs for nonevent firms in business groups. The independent variables with regard to an event firm are Market Reaction (i.e., five-day CARs for the event firms in business groups); Size (i.e., the natural logarithm of the market value of equity); ROA (i.e., the ratio of net income to total assets); Leverage (i.e., the ratio of total debt to total assets); M/B (i.e., the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity); R&D (i.e., the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales); Cash (i.e., the ratio of cash to total assets); and Credit Rating (i.e., the level of the original credit rating of the event firm, with higher values indicating higher credit ratings). The independent variables with regard to a business group are Number of Affiliates (i.e., the number of group member firms); Group Size (i.e., the mean Size of a business group); Group ROA (i.e., the mean ROA of a business group); Group Leverage (i.e., the mean Leverage of a business group); Group M/B (i.e., the mean M/B of a business group); Group R&D (i.e., the mean R&D of a business group); and Group Cash (i.e., the mean Cash of a business group). The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at group level. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) Table 5 with the exception of Positive Reaction, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the market reaction of an event firm is positive and zero otherwise, and a * b, which is the interaction term between Market Reaction and Positive Reaction. The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at group level. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) This table shows spillover effects that are driven by the market reactions of event firms by dividing our samples into two subsamples according to whether or not they are "leading firms" in their business groups. Panel A shows spillover effects that are driven by the credit rating changes of leading firms and Panel B shows spillover effects that are driven by the credit rating changes of non-leading firms. Each panel is methodologically equal to that of Table 4 . Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. The three panels of this table show that the spillover effects that are driven by the market reactions of event firms are more dominant if the business relationship between an event firm and affiliated firms is closer. The variables used to measure the level of a business relationship are Receivable (i.e., the ratio of the amount of receivables associated with affiliated firms to the total assets of an event firm), Payable (i.e., the ratio of the amount of payables related to affiliated firms to the total assets of an event firm), Sales (i.e., the amount of sales to affiliated firms divided by the total sales of an event firm), Purchases (i.e., the amount of purchases from affiliated firms divided by the total sales of an event firm), Debt Guarantee (i.e., the ratio of the amount of debt guarantee for affiliated firms to the total debt of an event firm), Collateral (i.e., the ratio of the amount of collateral for affiliated firms to the total debt of an event firm), and Ownership (i.e., the ratio of the amount of equity investment for affiliated firms to the equity participation by affiliated firms divided by the entire market value of equity). By using these variables, we construct each indicator variable, which takes a value of one if the variable is above its cross-sectional median and zero otherwise. In Panel A, all regressions are repeated by including indicator variables and interaction terms between the indicator variables and Market Reaction. All regressions in Panel B and C are repeated by dividing our event samples into two subsamples based on whether the levels of business relationship (i.e., seven indicator variables) are high or low. The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at group level. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the parameter estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
